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Abstract 
      Over the past 35 years, the One Child Policy (OCP) has had enormous influences 
on almost every aspect of Chinese society. The exacerbated unbalanced sex ratio and 
the unequal implementation of the OCP between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities 
have brought some interesting changes to China’s marriage market. This paper 
explores the differences between the marital prospects of Han Chinese and ethnic 
minorities under the influence of the OCP. Using 2007 China Household Income 
Project (Data) and 2010 Chinese Population Census Data, this paper finds that under 
the circumstances of the OCP, Han Chinese, especially Han women, enjoy more 
advantages in the marriage market than ethnic minorities. This paper also finds that  
ethnic minority population share of a city starts to play an important role in determining 
individual’s marital prospect since the implementation of the OCP, and Han Chinese 
are more likely to be married in cities with high ethnic minority population shares.   
Key Words: the One Child Policy • Marriage Market • Ethnicity 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Initially introduced and implemented in 1979, China’s One Child Policy (OCP) 
has been the focus of attention for the past 35 years. This policy by the government of 
People’s Republic of China aims at controlling the overall population growth while 
increasing the population quality as a whole. To curtail population growth and to 
mitigate the huge pressure the large population posed on the society, economy and 
environment, the One Child Policy restricts couples of urban residency to have only 
one child, while permitting second child or more children in cases such as twins, 
urban residency couples with birth-defect first child, couples who both lack siblings 
themselves, couples of rural residency, and ethnic minority population. Residents of 
the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong and Macau as well as foreigners 
living in China are exempt from this policy.  
Considering the fact that China is a country with diversified ethnic groups, the 
One Child Policy has also become a part of Chinese government’s policies towards 
ethnic groups. Chinese government, when implementing the One Child Policy, 
formulated different population control policies for ethnic majority and ethnic 
minorities. Han Chinese, the largest ethnic group that takes up 91.5% of the total 
population in China, is the main target of the One Child Policy. Han couples with of 
urban residency are restricted to have only one child. Most of the population 
belonging to ethnic minority groups are automatically granted second child 
permission, and those belonging to ethnic minority groups such as Tibetan, Daur, 
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Evenks and Oroqen are exempted from the population control policy, being allowed 
to have as many children as they want.  
One Child Policy has received wide concerns for the unintended negative 
consequences it brings to Chinese society. One of the consequences that have long 
been criticized is the unusual high sex ratio (fraction of males to females in the 
Chinese population) in China’s population. The map (Ball, 2008) below presents an 
overview of China’s sex ratio in 2000, 21 years after the enforcement of the One 
Child Policy. 
 
 
 
The extremely high sex ratio has led to the marriage market squeeze for the 
male population in China. It is predicted that in 2020, approximately 26 million male 
populations from 22 years old to 34 years old will be unable to find a spouse 
(Women’s Rights in China, 2013). However, since the One Child Policy is unequally 
implemented by ethnic identities, the influences it has on sex ratio also differ among 
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ethnic groups. Ethnic minorities, who are less affected by One Child Policy, have less 
distorted sex ratio than the Han Chinese, and thus face less severe marriage market 
squeeze.  
Although there are various literatures regarding how One Child Policy affects 
the sex ratio and gender equality in contemporary China, hardly any research has been 
conducted on the influences One Child Policy has on marriage prospects of different 
ethnic groups. In my research, I want to find out how One Child Policy, mainly 
through sex ratio, differently affects the marriage prospects of people who are Han 
Chinese and who are ethnic minorities, a topic that has not been fully explored in 
earlier research and literatures. Here are 3 major questions I want to tackle in my 
research: 
1. What role do sex ratio plays in marriage market and how does it differently affect 
the marriage prospects of Han Chinese and ethnic minorities?  
2. How do the marriage prospects differ between male and female population in 
China? Does the shortage of female population give women advantages in 
marriage market and make women more likely to be married? 
3. Considering the fact that the One Child Policy leads to different sex ratios 
between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities, and ethnic minorities are allowed to 
have more than one child, does ethnic minority identity give one advantages in 
marriage market and make one more likely to be married? 
 
Knowing the effects the One Child Policy has on the marriage prospects of 
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population with different ethnic identities plays an important role in understating 
China’s marriage market and evaluating China’s ethnic policies. Different marriage 
prospects of Han Chinese and ethnic minorities not only reflect the changes in China’s 
interethnic relations, but also reveal the discrepancies the One Child Policy creates 
between the ethnic majority group and ethnic minority groups. Discrepancies revealed 
in this research could be used as reference for Chinese government in terms of future 
amendments to China’s population control policy and ethnic policies.  
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
There are various existing literatures on how the One Child Policy contributes 
to China’s distorted sex ratio, how sex ratio affects marriage market, what factors 
influence interethnic marriage, and what factors determine one’s marriage prospect. In 
the literature review section, I will discuss some of the papers that play a key role in 
inspiring my research, and further motivating my study on the influences the One 
Child Policy has on China’s marriage market.  
Gary S. Becker (1974) proposes two principles that explain why people marry, 
and why the marriage market exists. Principle one explains the reason for getting 
married: marriage is expected to raise the utility level above that of remaining single 
for those who choose to be married. Principle two, which argues that men and women 
compete when they seek mates, explains the existence of marriage market.  
Becker points out that the change in utility level is associated with cost of and 
gains from marriage. For individuals to determine whether the marriage is worthwhile, 
gains from marriage has to be balanced against the cost, such as the cost of looking 
for a mate. The greater the gains from marriage, the more incentive individuals have 
to get married. Generally speaking, a man and a woman choose to get married and 
share the same household if the household production exceeds the sum of productions 
when both man and woman are staying single.  
Productions of marriage have a wide variety of contents, and are not limited to 
financial gains such as wage income and property. Productions of marriage are 
classified into two categories: marketable product, such as wage income and property, 
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and nonmarketable product, such as quality of meals, love, companionship and health 
status. Traits of individuals in marriage market, such as beauty, education, race and 
religion, can affect marketable as well as nonmarketable products of marriage. 
Therefore, when determining whether to get married, people have to think about not 
only the marketable and nonmarketable products they will produce after the marriage, 
but also the traits of their potential spouses.  
Interestingly, Becker points out that an obvious explanation for men and 
women to get married is the desire to produce their own children. Child is a unique 
gain, as well as product, of marriage, and being able to have a child, or more than one 
child, may give individuals advantage in the marriage market. China’s One Child 
Policy limits most Han Chinese to have only one child, while permitting more 
children for ethnic minorities. Therefore, Han Chinese and ethnic minorities face 
different situations in marriage market due to the unequal implementation of the One 
Child Policy, which affects the number of offspring different Chinese are allowed to 
have. 
Following Becker’s theory, several key products of marriage and traits of 
potential spouse, as well as other factors that can affect individual marital status, will 
be further discussed in this section.  
Butera (2012), considering that China’s One Child Policy is unequally 
implemented between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities, gives detailed examination 
on variables that may influence China’s interethnic marriage and tries to determine 
what variables significantly affect people’s interethnic marriage decisions. Variables 
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discussed in Butara’s paper include number of biethnic households, population by 
ethnicity, population of never married male/ female, unemployment due to disability, 
GDP per capita/ per household, age groups, marriage migration, and education 
attainment level. Using centered interaction and OLS estimation, Butera in her paper 
investigates what ethnic groups are most affected in marriage market by these 
variables, and which part of the population is the driven force of China’s interethnic 
marriage.  
Empirical results in Butera’s paper show that Han female is the main 
contributor to China’s interethnic marriage, and women’s decisions to choose 
interethnic marriage are largely determined by their gains from marriage. The fact that 
ethnic minorities are allowed to have more than one child due to the unequal 
implementation of One Child Policy increases gains associated with interethnic 
marriage and encourages Han Chinese, especially Han women, to marry people who 
are ethnic minorities.  
Butera’s paper is extremely important because it is the initial inspiration of my 
research. Butera’s findings imply that ethnic minority identity may become an 
advantage in marriage market, since the unequal enforcement of the One Child Policy 
increases gains from interethnic marriage by granting couples privileges such as 
permissions to have more than one child. In my research, I want to take Butera’s study 
one step further, and investigate how the privileges ethnic minorities enjoy and the 
different sex ratios created by the unequal implementation of the One Child Policy 
affect the marital status of Han Chinese and ethnic minorities.  
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It is commonly believed that the abnormally high sex ratio, which is fraction 
of males to females in the Chinese population, is linked to the enforcement of One 
Child Policy. Bulte, Heerink and Zhang (2011), by analyzing 2000 Chinese 
Population Census Data, discover that there is a statistically significant positive 
correlation between sex ratio and the implementation of One Child Policy. Bulte, 
Heerink and Zhang argue that strong son preference in Chinese society leads to the 
gender gap, and the implementation of the One Child Policy exacerbates the 
imbalanced gender ratio by stimulating the sex-selective abortions. Son preference 
has long been prevalent in Chinese society, and sex-selective induced abortions have 
been made possible by employing the ultrasound B technology to identify the gender 
of the fetuses. Under the One Child Policy, couples with strong son preference choose 
to abort the female fetuses to guarantee the birth of sons, an action that leads to a 
more skewed sex ratio in Chinese population. 
Zheng, Tu, Gu, and Li (1993) further strengthen the argument raised by Bulte, 
Heerink and Zhang. By analyzing data gathered from a project on surveillance for 
birth defects in eight provinces and cities conducted by Beijing Medical University, 
Zheng, Tu, Gu, and Li find out that the sex ratio, which is the number of aborted male 
fetus to number of aborted female fetus, is 94.6 of the 500 aborted fetus in rural and 
96.8 of the 1,226 aborted fetus in urban. This sex ratio of the aborted fetuses whose 
gender is identifiable is significantly lower than the normal fetus sex ratio of 106, 
implying that some of the pregnant women underwent prenatal sex identifications and 
gender-specific abortions.  
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Considering the fact that the One Child Policy is unequally implemented 
between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities, the One Child Policy not only leads to 
high sex ratio in Chinese population, but also contributes to the sex ratio differences 
between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities. Bulte, Heerink and Zhang in their paper 
also observe how provincial sex ratio varies with the number of Han Chinese in that 
province. They find out that following the implementation of One Child Policy, 
gender ratios are more distorted in provinces with more Han population, who are the 
main subjects of the One Child Policy, and more balanced in regions where ethnic 
minority population concentrate. This finding implies that unequal enforcement of the 
One Child Policy affects sex ratio of Han Chinese more than that of ethnic minorities.  
Papers by Bulte and Zheng build the foundation of my research by 
demonstrating that the One Child Policy is the main contributor to China’s 
imbalanced sex ratio, and that this population control policy leads to the sex ratio 
difference between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities. My research will take their 
arguments one step further, and investigate how the distorted sex ratios created by the 
unequal enforcement of One Child Policy differently affect the marriage market of 
Han Chinese and ethnic minorities.  
      The extremely high sex ratio has led to the marriage market squeeze for the 
men in China. A recent report from Women’s Rights in China (2013) predicts that in 
2020, approximately 26 million male populations from 22 years old to 34 years old 
will be unable to find a spouse, and the marriage market squeeze will extend beyond 
2030. Meanwhile, a lot studies have been devoted to how imbalanced sex ratios affect 
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the marriage pattern in a society.  
      South and Lloyd (1992) in their paper discuss what effects imbalanced sex 
ratio has on women’s marriage opportunities and how women’s marriage 
opportunities influences women’s decisions on family formation. The most interesting 
point in South and Lloyd’s research is that two different methods are used to measure 
women’s marriage opportunities. One measurement is the availability ratio: a fraction 
with numerator being the number of suitable men to women of a particular age, race 
and education level, and denominator being the average number of women suitable 
for the men in numerator. Availability ratio that is greater than 100 shows that there 
are more suitable men than suitable women in marriage market, suggesting that 
women enjoy preferences in marriage market. Another measurement is the sex ratio, 
which is the fraction of male population to female population of a specific age group. 
By employing OLS regression equation, South and Lloyd observe that marriage 
opportunities by different measurements present similar relation with female marriage 
rate: an oversupply of men in marriage market tends to increase women’s marriage 
rate. South and Lloyd conclude that in the marriage market where gender ratio is 
distorted, preference and advantage are shifted to the gender with less population. 
Relative surplus of one gender, which includes abundant alternatives to the other 
gender’s current spouses, tends to increase the probability that the other gender will 
be married.  
      Angrist (2002), by analyzing marriage rate and sex ratio of the first and second 
immigrant generations in the United States, also finds out a positive association 
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between sex ratio and female marriage rate. Angrist uses the increased availability of 
potential spouses to explain the observed positive relation. Angrist also discovers that 
the effect sex ratio has on marriage is stronger among ethnic groups in which 
endogamy is more prevalent. Papers by South and Angrist shed light on how marriage 
market for Han Chinese and ethnic minorities can be affected by the different sex 
ratios of Han Chinese and ethnic minority population, a consequence of the unequal 
implementation of the One Child Policy. 
Besides gender ratio, Butera’s paper also discusses how education and income 
affect China’s interethnic marriage. Other economists have also investigated how 
these two factors affect marriage market and interethnic marriage decisions, especially 
for female population. Furtado and Theodoropoulos (2011) explore the role education 
attainment plays on interethnic marriage decisions. By analyzing data on education 
attainment levels and interethnic marriage of different ethnic groups in the United 
States, Furtado and Theodoropoulos discover that higher education attainment in 
general decreases people’s possibility to marry within the same ethnic group, and the 
significance of the impact education has on interethnic marriage differs across 
population with different cultural and educational backgrounds. Furtado and 
Theodoropoulos’ paper, together with Butera’s paper, inspired me to include 
education variable in my empirical framework to more accurately estimate change in 
marital status.   
       Gyimah (2009), by analyzing data from the 1988, 1993, 1998 and 2003 
Ghana Demographic and Health Survey, discovers that women with higher education 
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attainment spend longer time on their transition to first marriage. Gyimah concludes 
that higher education attainment on the one hand provide women with better job 
opportunities and more stable economic status, so women with higher education 
attainment are able to conduct longer and more demanding searches for better spouses. 
One the other hand, higher education attainment decreases women’s gains from 
getting married, so women with high education attainment may simply choose to stay 
single if they do not expect substantial gains from marriage. It will be interesting to 
look at Gyimah’s findings in terms of China’s marriage market, where sex ratio is 
more imbalanced than that of Ghana.  
      In addition to education attainment level, income is another factor that affects 
individual’s marital prospect and marital status. Burgess, Propper and Aassve (2003) 
proposed two opposite effects income has on marriage related decisions: self-reliance 
effect and good-catch effect. Self-reliance effect suggests that higher earning 
decreases one’s gains from marriage, therefore increases one’s probability to stay out 
of marriage. Good-catch effect suggests that higher earning makes one more desirable 
in marriage market, therefore brings one more offers of marriage. Burgess, Propper 
and Aassve find out that the effect income has on men’s and women’s marital 
prosepcts is very different. The dominant effect marriage has on male population is 
good-catch effect: higher income increases the possibility for men to get married. On 
the contrary, women are largely affected by the self-reliance effect, and higher income 
is associated with lower marriage rates of female population. Burgess, Propper and 
Aassve’s paper partly explains why separate regressions are run for male and female 
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population in my research: opposite effect income has on one’s marital status may be 
observed between male and female population.  
      Papers discussed in this section not only motivate my research, but also 
become the academic foundations of my study and inspire the choices of variables in 
my research. Previous literatures have indicated that age, sex ratio, products from 
marriage such as income and employment status, and personal traits such as education 
all affect individual’s marital status. However, earlier research has not fully 
investigated how the One Child Policy and ethnicity are linked in the marriage market. 
By incorporating into existing theory the ethnic identity, I plan to explore that 
depending on individual’s gender and ethnic identity, how individual marital status is 
affected by sex ratio, a variable which is largely influenced by the One Child Policy, 
and population share of ethnic minority, which affects the marital status of Han 
Chinese and ethnic minorities differently. Here are a few of the hypotheses I want to 
test in my research: 
(1) In general, the high sex ratios in China give women advantage in marriage market, 
and make women more likely to be married than men regardless of ethnicity.  
(2) Ethnic minority women in general face more competition in marriage market than 
Han women, while ethnic minority men have more advantage in marriage market 
than Han men. Therefore, Han women and ethnic minority men are more likely to 
be married than Han men and ethnic minority women, respectively.  
(3) Due to the more balanced sex ratio, women in cities with larger ethnic minority 
population share have less advantage in marriage market, and thus are less likely 
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to be married than women in cities with smaller ethnic minority share. On the 
contrary, the chances are higher for men to be married in cities with larger ethnic 
minority population shares, since there are more potential spouses available.  
Based on previous literatures, variables included my empirical framework are: 
marital status, gender, age, income, education, employment status, ethnic identity, sex 
ratio, ethnic minority population share, and OCP effect. These variables and their 
implications in my research will be further discussed in Data Description and Variable 
Definition chapter.  
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Chapter Three: Data Description and Variable Definitions 
Data for my research are compiled from 2007 China Household Income 
Project (CHIP) Data and 2010 Chinese Population Census Data. The 2007 CHIP Data 
is obtained from China Institute for Income Distribution. In the 2007 CHIP Data, 
Dataset One, Two and Three of Urban Individual Income, Consumption and 
Employment Data, and Dataset One, Two and Three of Rural Individual Income, 
Consumption and Employment Data, are chosen for data on the following variables: 
marital status, gender, age, 𝑎𝑎𝑎2, income, education, employment, Han and OCP 
dummy. Data on the variables sex ratio and ethnic minority population share are 
gathered from 2010 Chinese Population Census Data, which is available on the 
official website of National Bureau of Statistics of China. Therefore, the model seems 
to examine how these variables are related to individual marriage status.  
 
Part 1: Dependent Variable  
Marital status  
      The dependent dummy variable marital status is used to define individual’s 
marital status. CHIP Data specifies individual marital status to be never married, with 
spouse, divorced, and widow/widower. The variable marital status takes the value of 
zero if an individual has never married and the value one if individual is in situation 
of with spouse, divorced, and widow/widower.  
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Part 2: Independent Variables 
Gender 
According to CHIP Data, the variable gender takes the value one if individual 
is male, and the value two if individual is female. This variable will not be included in 
the regression equations, but separate regressions will be run for male and female 
population. According to the existing literatures, variables such as sex ratio, ethnic 
minority population share and income have different effects on the marital status of 
men and women. Therefore, running separate regressions for male and female 
population better captures the discrepancies between the marital prospects of male 
and female population. 
 
Age and 𝐴𝑎𝑎2 
      The variable age takes the value of individual’s age in 2007, the year the CHIP 
Survey was conducted. According to Goodkind’s claim that the age of first marriage 
for Chinese men is between 23 and 27, and Tien’s claim that the age of first marriage 
for Chinese women is between 23 and 25 (Goodkind, 2006 and Tien, 1983), it is 
possible that the effect age has on marital status is not a linear variable. Individuals’ 
chances of being married increase with age, but the rate of increase gradually 
decreases as individuals get old. Therefore, in order to capture the diminishing rate of 
increase in chances of being married, the variable 𝑎𝑎𝑎2, which equals age * age, is 
also included in the regressions.  
      Also, considering the average age of first marriage of Chinese population, data 
17 
 
used in this research only include individuals from 15 to 55 years old. Individuals 
who are below 15 years old or beyond 55 years old are excluded from the dataset.  
 
Income 
The variable income, in CHIP Data, initially takes the value of each 
individual’s monthly income. The monthly income is measured in Yuan, which is the 
base unit of Chinese currency. According to the economic theory of marriage, 
economic factors play an important role in marriage decisions. Economic condition, 
which is assessed by individual’s income, is another key variable people consider 
when choosing spouses. As suggested in the existing literatures, income has different 
impacts on male and female population in the marriage market. This is another reason 
why separate regressions are run for male and female population. 
In order to eliminate the large number of zero after the decimal point, the 
variable Income used in the regressions is modified by dividing individual monthly 
income by 1000. In other words, Income = individual monthly income/1000. 
 
Education level 
      The variable education level is defined as the highest education attainment 
individual has achieved. CHIP Data specified individual’s education attainment into 
25 levels from elementary school, grade 1 to phD, the fourth year. In this research, 
each education attainment level has its own dummy variable. For each education level, 
the variable education level takes the value one if the level is individual’s highest 
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education attainment level. Otherwise, the variable education level will take the value 
zero.  
Previous studies have revealed that while education attainment matters less to 
men, decline in marriage rates has been most pronounced in highly educated women 
(Raymo and Iwasawa 2005, Gyimah, 2009). This offers another explanation on why 
separate regressions are run for male and female population in this research. 
 
Employment status 
      The variable employment status represents individual’s employment status. In 
CHIP Data, individual’s employment status is specified into the following ten 
categories: 
(1) Employed (wage earner, farmer or self-employed) 
(2) Reemployed retired worker 
(3) Unemployed 
(4) Retired 
(5) Household worker 
(6) Family worker 
(7) Lost capacity to work 
(8) In-school student/ preschool student 
(9) Awaiting job assignment/ commencement of further education/ withdrawn 
from studies 
(10) Others  
19 
 
Similar with education variable, each employment status category has its own 
employment status dummy variable, which takes the value one if individual’s 
employment status belongs to this category and zero otherwise.  
 
Ethnic identity 
The variable Ethnic identity captures individual’s ethnic identity. Ethnic 
identities in CHIP Data include: 
(1) Han (the majority) 
(2) Zhuang 
(3) Hui 
(4) Uygur 
(5) Yi  
(6) Miao 
(7) Man 
(8) Others 
      The variable Ethnic identity takes the value one if individual’s ethnic identity 
is Han, and the value zero if individual belongs to other ethnic groups. 
 
OCP  
      The variable OCP is used to estimate the effect the implementation of the OCP 
has on individual’s marital status. This variable takes the value zero for individuals 
who reached their legal marriage age (22 for males and 20 for females) before the 
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implementation of the OCP, which started from 1979. If individuals did not reach 
their legal marriage age before the implementation of the OCP, the variable OCP 
takes the value one.  
 
 
Sex ratio 
The variable sex ratio is defined as the ratio of males to females in a 
population by age cohort in the city the individual resides. It measures the sex 
composition of the population, and is an independent variable commonly used to 
capture the squeeze of marriage market.  
Considering the fact that marriage markets are local and most people choose 
their spouse from their community or nearby community, sex ratio at city level will 
have a stronger effect than sex ratio at national level on marriage market (Fossett and 
Kiecolt, 1991). Sex ratios of 77 cities where individuals in CHIP Data reside, 
including 18 urban cities and 59 rural cities, are used in the regressions. Formula for 
computing the sex ratio used in the regressions is: 
Sex ratio = M/F 
where M and F represent the population of male and female respectively in the city 
where the individual resides.  
Sex ratio is calculated by age cohort with 5 years interval. For example, sex 
ratio used for individual who is 23 years old is the sex ratio of population between 20 
to 25 years old in the city where the individual resides. Among the 77 cities included 
in this research, the city Fuyang in Anhui Province has the lowest age cohort sex ratio 
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of 0.79 and the city Xiantao in Hubei Province has the highest age cohort sex ratio of 
1.62. 
 
Ethnic minority population share 
      The variable Ethnic minority population share measures the proportion of 
ethnic minority population in cities where individuals reside. Due to the local 
marriage market theory, ethnic minority population share are calculated at city level 
using the formula: 
Ethnic minority population share of city c where the individual i resides= 
(Ethnic minority population in city C/ Total population in city C)*100% 
      It would be helpful if ethnic minority population share could be calculated by 
age cohort. However, the 2010 Chinese Population Census Data is not detailed 
enough for that to be done. In the 77 cities where the individuals reside, the city 
Bazhong in Sichuan Province has the lowest ethnic minority population share of 
0.01%, and the city Chengde in Hebei Province has the highest ethnic minority 
population share of 43.6%.  
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Chapter Four: Empirical Framework 
Cross-section analysis with a multiple linear regression model is used in my 
research. Interaction terms are also included to estimate the specific effects sex ratio, 
ethnic minority population share and the OCP have on marital status. Main variables 
included in the empirical framework are listed as below: 
𝑚𝑖𝑖: Marital status (never married or ever married) dummy of individual i living in 
city c 
𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖: Ethnic identity (Han or ethnic minority) dummy of individual i living in city c 
𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 : Age of individual i living in city c 
𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖
2  : Square of individual i’s age 
𝑦𝑖𝑖: Income of individual i living in city c 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖: Education level of individual i living in city c 
𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖: Employment status dummy of individual i living in city c 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖: OCP dummy of individual i living in city c 
𝑆𝑆𝑖: Sex ratio by age cohort in city c where individual i resides 
𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖: Ethnic minority population share of city c where individual i resides 
 
Part 1: Basic Regressions  
The following estimating equation (Equation 1) will be used for the marital 
status dummy m (never married or ever married) of individual i living in city c: 
          𝑚𝑖𝑖= 𝛽0+𝛽1𝐴𝑎𝑎+𝛽2𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖2+𝛽3𝑦𝑖𝑖+𝛽4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖+𝛽5𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖+𝛽6𝑆𝑆𝑖+𝛽7𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖+ε0  
    where 𝛽0 is the constant term and 𝜀0 is the error term  
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      Using this equation, separate regressions are run for male and female 
population of Han and ethnic minorities. 
 
      𝐴𝑎𝑎 is expected to be positively correlated with marital status: the older the 
individual gets, the more likely the individual to be married. 𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖2  is used to capture 
the diminishing rate of increase in individual’s chance of being married, and it can be 
either positively or negatively correlated with marital status.   
      𝑦𝑖𝑖 is expected to be positively correlated with the marital status of male 
population (good-catch effect) and negatively correlated with the marital status of 
female population (self-reliance effect).  
      𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable in the empirical framework. Higher education 
attainment level is usually associated with better marital prospects of male population, 
while it decreases women’s probability of getting married by increasing their financial 
independence. It is possible that there exists a cutting point in education attainment 
level: education level increases women’s possibility to be married below the point, 
and decreases women’s possibility to be married beyond the point.       
      𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 is expected to be positively correlated with the marital status of male 
population: job brings one income, and therefore makes one more desirable in the 
marriage market. However, since being employed increases women’s financial 
independence, 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖  may be negatively correlated the marital status of female 
population.                𝑆𝑆𝑖 is expected to be negatively correlated with the marital status of male 
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population and positively correlated with female population: preferences are shifted to 
female population in marriage markets where sex ratio is high, making female 
population more likely to find a spouse and male population less likely to be married. 
However, since the unequal enforcement of the OCP has led to different sex ratios of 
Han and ethnic minorities, the effect sex ratio has on marital status also differs 
between Han and ethnic minorities. Therefore, an interaction term between individual 
ethnic identity and city level sex ratio is included in the later regressions.  
      The influence 𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖 has on marital status may differ not only between male 
and female population, but also between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities. 
Therefore, an interaction term between individual ethnic identity and ethnic minority 
population share of the city the individual resides is later included in the estimation 
equation.  
       
Part 2: Regressions with Interaction Terms on Sex Ratio and Ethnic Minority 
Population Share 
      To find out whether city level cohort sex ratio differently affects the marital 
status of Hans and ethnic minorities, an interaction term between individual ethnic 
identity and city level cohort sex ratio is added to Equation 1, and the following 
regression will be run for male and female population separately: 
𝑚𝑖𝑖= 𝛽0+𝛽1𝐴𝑎𝑎+𝛽2𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖2+𝛽3𝑦𝑖𝑖+𝛽4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖+𝛽5𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖+𝛽6𝑆𝑆𝑖+𝛽7𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖+𝛽8𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖+𝛽9𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖*𝑆𝑆𝑖+𝜀0 
      The different effect city level cohort sex ratio has on marital status of Hans 
and ethnic minorities can be estimated by taking the cross-partial derivative of the 
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equation above: 
𝜕𝑚𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝑆𝑆𝑖
 = 𝛽6 + 𝛽9𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 
 
      Similarly, to estimate how city level ethnic minority population share 
differently affects the marital status of Han Chinese and ethnic minorities, an 
interaction term between individual ethnic identity and city level ethnic minority 
population share is added to Equation 1, and the following regression will be run for 
male and female population separately: 
𝑚𝑖𝑖= 𝛽0+𝛽1𝐴𝑎𝑎+𝛽2𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖2+𝛽3𝑦𝑖𝑖+𝛽4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖+𝛽5𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖+𝛽6𝑆𝑆𝑖+𝛽7𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖+𝛽8𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖+𝛽9𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖*𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖+𝜀0 
      The different effect city level cohort sex ratio has on marital status of Hans 
and ethnic minorities can be estimated by taking the cross-partial derivative of the 
equation above: 
𝜕𝑚𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖
 = 𝛽7 + 𝛽9𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 
 
      To test how sex ratio and ethnic minority population share together differently 
affect the marital status of male and female population, an interaction term between 
city level cohort sex ratio and city level ethnic minority population share is included 
in Equation 1, and the following regression is run for male and female population 
separately: 
𝑚𝑖𝑖= 𝛽0+𝛽1𝐴𝑎𝑎+𝛽2𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖2+𝛽3𝑦𝑖𝑖+𝛽4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖+𝛽5𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖+𝛽6𝑆𝑆𝑖+𝛽7𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖+𝛽8𝑆𝑆𝑖*𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖+𝜀0 
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Part 3: OCP Effect on Marital Status 
      To take into account the effect the OCP has on marital status, the OCP dummy 
variable and an interaction term between OCP dummy and city level ethnic minority 
population share are added to Equation 1, and the following regression is run for male 
and female population separately: 
𝑚𝑖𝑖= 𝛽0+𝛽1𝐴𝑎𝑎+𝛽2𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖2 +𝛽3𝑦𝑖𝑖+𝛽4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖+𝛽5𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖+𝛽6𝑆𝑆𝑖+𝛽7𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖+𝛽8𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖+𝛽9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖*𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖+𝜀0 
      The different effects ethnic minority population share has on marital status 
before and after the implementation of the OCP can be estimated by taking 
cross-partial derivative of the equation above: 
𝜕𝑚𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖
 = 𝛽7 + 𝛽9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 
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Chapter Five: Empirical Results 
The results of regression analysis are presented in this chapter. This chapter 
consists of three sections: Part 1 discusses the empirical results of the basic regression 
models. Part 2 includes interaction terms, which are used to estimate the different 
impacts sex ratio and ethnic population share have on the marital status of male and 
female population of Han and ethnic minorities. Part 3 captures the effect of OCP on 
marital status by including OCP dummy variable and an interaction term between 
OCP and ethnic minority population share to investigate whether the effect OCP has 
on marital status started even before the sex ratio started to change.  
 
Part 1: Empirical Results of Basic Regressions 
      Table 1 exhibits the OLS estimates of the effects age, income, education level, 
employment status, sex ratio and ethnic minority population share have on the marital 
status of male and female population of Han and ethnic minorities. 
 
Han Population  
      Column (1) and column (2) present the regression results of male and female 
Han population respectively. Age is positively correlated with marital status of both 
Han men and Han women, and age squared is negatively correlated with Han men’s 
and Han women’s marital status. Regression results on age and age squared are all 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Generally speaking, increase in age makes it 
more likely for Han individuals to be married, but the magnitude of the likelihood 
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gradually decreases as individuals get old. The effect age has on Han Chinese’s 
chance of being married is larger on Han women than Han men: increase in age gives 
Han women higher chances to be married than Han men.  
      Income is positively correlated with marital status of both Han men and Han 
women, suggesting that Han individuals with higher income are more likely to be 
married than Han individuals with lower income. The higher income coefficient of 
Han women suggests that the effect income has on individual’s chance of being 
married is larger on Han female than Han male.  
      Education level in general increases individual’s chance of being married for 
both genders. It is worth noticing that this positive correlation between Han 
individual’s education level and chance of being married only exists below certain 
education levels. If one keeps pursuing higher education attainment above the certain 
level, the higher education level one attains, the less likely that one is to be married.  
      Being employed is positively associated Han population’s marital status, for 
both male and female population. In other words, Han individuals who are employed 
are more likely to be married than those who are not.  
      Previous literatures suggest that in the marriage market where sex ratio is 
distorted, preference and advantages are shifted to the gender with less population. 
Therefore, an increase in the amount of marriageable men tend to increase women’s 
chance of being married (South and Llyod, 1992). The regression result of Han 
women supports the conclusion in existing literature review: the positive female 
Han’s sex ratio coefficient, which is statistically significant at the 1% level, suggests 
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that as Han women’s chance of being married increases as sex ratio increases. 
However, sex ratio and marital status of Han men are also positively correlated at the 
1% statistically significant level, implying that an increase in sex ratio also increases 
Han men’s chance of being married. It is even more interesting to notice that the sex 
ratio coefficient of Han men, which is 1.118, is larger than the 0.982 sex ratio 
coefficient of Han women, suggesting a larger impact increase in sex ratio has on Han 
men’s chance of being married.  
      One of the hypotheses raised in my research is that due to the more balanced 
sex ratio, women in cities with larger ethnic minority population share have less 
advantage in marriage market, and thus are less likely to be married than women in 
cities with smaller share of ethnic minority population. On the contrary, the chances 
for men to be married are higher in cities with larger ethnic minority population share 
due to the increase in potential spouse supply. The hypothesis is supported by the 
positive coefficient of ethnic minority population share in Han men regression: 
increase in ethnic minority population share is associated with more balanced sex 
ratio and higher female population, decreasing the competition Han men face in 
marriage market and increasing Han men’s chances of being married. However, the 
regression result of Han women is telling a different story. Positive coefficient of 
ethnic minority population share in Han women regression suggests that in cities with 
higher ethnic minority population share, Han women also have a higher chance of 
being married.        
      The positive effect higher ethnic minority population share on Han women’s 
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chance of being married can be explained by the relation between marriage decision 
and potential gains from marriage discussed in the literature review chapter: increase 
in gains associated with marriage gives women more incentives to choose getting 
married (Becker, 1974). Han women, by marrying ethnic minority men, can be 
allowed to have more than one child, which is regarded as gains from marriage. In 
cities where there are larger shares of ethnic minority population, there are more 
available ethnic minority men to Han women. Therefore, seeing the potential gains 
from marriage, more Han women may choose to form families with ethnic minority 
men, increasing Han women’s chance of being married.  
 
Ethnic Minority Population 
      Column (3) and column (4) present the regression results of male and female 
ethnic minority population respectively. Similar with results from Han population 
regression, age is positively correlated with marital status of both ethnic minority men 
and ethnic minority women, while age squared is negatively correlated with marital 
status of ethnic minority men and ethnic minority women. The age coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 5% level and the age squared coefficient of statistically 
significant at the 10% level for ethnic minority men, while regression results of age 
and age squared are not statistically significant for ethnic minority women.  
      Income is positively correlated with marital status of both ethnic minority men 
and ethnic minority women, but the income coefficient is statistically insignificant for 
both ethnic minority men and ethnic minority women.  
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      Regression results do not show a clear pattern how education level affects the 
marital status of ethnic minority men. However, education level is negatively 
associated with the marital status of ethnic minority women: higher education level 
decreases ethnic minority women’s chances of being married.  
      There are a lot of missing values of the employment status of ethnic minorities. 
The lack of data makes it hard to conclude what effect employment status has on 
ethnic minorities’ chances of being married.  
      Sex ratio is positively correlated with marital status of ethnic minority men, 
and negatively correlated with marital status of ethnic minority women. However, 
these coefficients are not statistically significant; therefore, it is hard to conclude how 
sex ratio differently affects the marital status of ethnic minority men and women.  
       Not having enough number of observations may be the major cause of 
insignificant regression results of ethnic minority population. There are only 82 ethnic 
minority men and 60 ethnic minority women, which are very small numbers of 
observations compared to 9796 Han men and 6563 Han women in the Han population 
regression. Therefore, it is more reasonable to conclude that lack of number of 
observations leads to the insignificant regression results than arbitrarily conclude that 
variables such as income and sex ratio are not correlated with the marital status of 
ethnic minority population. 
      However, there is still some significance in the ethnic minority share 
coefficients. Tough it is initially hypothesized that men in cities with high ethnic 
minority population share are more likely to be married while women in such cities 
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are less likely to be married, regression results for ethnic minority population suggest 
some interesting facts which are different from the initial hypothesis. Ethnic minority 
population share is negatively correlated with the marital status of both ethnic 
minority men and ethnic minority women at the 1% statistically significant level, 
implying that ethnic minority men and women are less likely to be married in cities 
with higher ethnic minority population share than in cities with lower ethnic minority 
population share. This is due to the fact that the ethnic minorities gradually lose their 
competitive advantages in marriage markets as the ethnic minority population share 
increases. With the increasing number of ethnic minorities in marriage market, ethnic 
minority men and women start to face more competitions within the ethnic minority 
group, and therefore become less likely to be married.  
      The effects sex ratio and ethnic minority population share have on the marital 
status of Han Chinese and ethnic minorities will be further discussed in the next 
section, in which interaction terms are included in the regressions.  
 
 
Part 2: Empirical Results of Regressions with Interaction Terms on Sex Ratio 
and Ethnic Minority Population Share 
      Table 2, in addition to displaying the OLS estimates of coefficients of 
independent variables from Part 1, also presents regression results of interaction terms 
between:  
(1) ethnic identity and sex ratio 
(2) ethnic identity and ethnic minority population share 
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(3) sex ratio and ethnic minority population share 
to specifically look at how sex ratio and ethnic minority population share differently 
affect the marital status of Han Chinese and ethnic minorities. Discussion in this 
section is focused on interpreting the interaction terms.  
 
Interaction Term between Ethnic Identity and Sex Ratio 
      Column (1) and column (2) present the regression estimates of the basic 
regression model with ethnic identity dummy, and an interaction term between ethnic 
identity and sex ratio, which is used to investigate how the effects sex ratio has on 
marital status differ between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities. Column (1) displays 
the regression results of male population, and column (2) displays the regression 
results of female population. The interaction term generated in the regressions is 
presented in the following equations:  
 
Male Population   𝑚𝑖𝑖= -1.333 + T1 + 0.853𝑆𝑆𝑖 - 0.454𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 0.310𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖*𝑆𝑆𝑖 
Female Population  𝑚𝑖𝑖= -0.569 + T2 - 0.348𝑆𝑆𝑖 - 1.516𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 1.372𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖*𝑆𝑆𝑖 
where T1  and T2  sum up, for male and female population respectively, the 
regression results of age, age squared, income, education level, employment status 
and ethnic minority population share, which are qualitatively similar with the results 
from regressions in Part 1.  
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      After including the interaction term, the effect sex ratio has on marital status 
becomes 0.853+0.31𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 for men and -0.348+1.372𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 for women. The interaction 
term coefficient of male population does not show any statistical significance, 
suggesting that according to the data, the effects sex ratio has on Han men and ethnic 
minority men’s marital status do not differ significantly.  
      Interaction term coefficient of female population is statistically significant at 
the 5% level, suggesting significantly different effects sex ratio has on the marital 
status of Han women and ethnic minority women. The effect sex ratio has on marital 
status of Han women, for whom 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖= 1, is -0.348 + 1.372*1= 1.024. For ethnic 
minority women, whose 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖= 0, the effect sex ratio has on marital status is 
-0.348+1.372*0= -0.348. In general, Han women are more likely to be married than 
ethnic minority women in cities with higher sex ratios, and the likelihood of being 
married increases as sex ratios increase. On the contrary, increase in sex ratio 
decreases ethnic minority women’s likelihood of being married.  
 
Interaction Term between Ethnic Identity and Ethnic Minority Population Share 
      Column (3) and column (4) present the regression results of the interaction 
term between ethnic identity and ethnic minority population share, which is used to 
investigate how the effects ethnic minority population share has on marital status 
differ between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities. Column (3) and column (4) display 
the regression results of male population and female population respectively. The 
interaction term generated in the regressions is presented in the following equations:  
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Male Population   𝑚𝑖𝑖= -1.456 + T3 - 0.0105𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖 - 0.293𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 0.0184𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖*𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖 
Female Population  𝑚𝑖𝑖= -1.806 + T4 - 0.00618𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖 – 0.231𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 0.0190𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖*𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖 
where T3  and T4  sum up the regression results of age, age squared, income, 
education level, employment status and sex ratio for male and female population. 
These results are qualitatively similar with results from Part (1). 
      Results on interaction term between ethnic identity and ethnic population 
share are statistically significant at the 1% level for both male and female population. 
With interaction term included in the regression, the effect ethnic minority population 
share has on marital status becomes -0.0105+ 0.0184𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 for male population and 
-0.00618+ 0.0190𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 for female population. 
      By substituting 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 1 for Hans and 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 0 for ethnic minorities, we get 
the effects ethnic minority population share has on marital status: 
 
Male Han 
𝜕𝑚𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖
 = -0.0105+0.0184*1 = 0.0263 
Male Ethnic Minorities 
𝜕𝑚𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖
 = -0.0105+0.0184*0 = -0.0105 
Female Han  
𝜕𝑚𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖
 = -0.00618+0.0190*1 = 0.01282 
Female Ethnic Minorities 
𝜕𝑚𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖
 = -0.00618+0.0190*0 = -0.00618 
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       Results of the interaction term are in accordance with the findings in Part 1. 
Ethnic minority population share is positively correlated with marital status of Han 
Chinese, suggesting that Hans more likely to be married in cities with higher ethnic 
minority population shares. On the contrary, ethnic minority population share has a 
negative effect on marital status of ethnic minorities, and being in cities with higher 
ethnic minority population decreases ethnic minorities’ chances of being married.  
 
Interaction Term between Sex Ratio and Ethnic Minority Population Share 
      The regression results of interaction term between sex ratio and ethnic 
minority population share are presented in column (4) and column (5) for male and 
female population respectively. This interaction term is used to test how sex ratio and 
ethnic minority population share together differently affect the marital status of male 
and female population. The following two equations summarize the interaction term 
generated in the regressions: 
 
Male Population   𝑚𝑖𝑖= -1.827 + T5 + 1.196𝑆𝑆𝑖 + 0.0236𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖 – 0.0233𝑆𝑆𝑖*𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖 
Female Population  𝑚𝑖𝑖= -2.040 + T6 + 0.981𝑆𝑆𝑖 – 0.0126𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖 + 0.0159𝑆𝑆𝑖*𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖 
where T5 and T6 represent the regression results of age, age2, income, education 
level, and employment status and sex ratio for male and female population. These 
results are qualitatively similar with results from Part (1). 
      However, the regression results on the interaction term are not statistically 
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significant for neither male nor female population. Therefore, it is hard to conclude 
how the effects sex ratio and ethnic minority population share together have on 
marital status differ between male and female population.  
 
Part 3: Empirical Results of OCP Effect on Marital Status 
      Table 3 presents the OLS regression results of the interaction term between 
the OCP and ethnic minority population share. The main purpose of including the 
interaction term is to estimate how the effect ethnic minority population has on 
marital status changed after the implementation of the OCP. Regression results of 
male and female population are summarized in column (1) and column (2) 
respectively. Interaction term generated in the regressions is illustrated in the 
following equations: 
 
Male Population   𝑚𝑖𝑖= -1.773 + T7 – 0.00647𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖 – 0.0147𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 + 0.00679𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖*𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖 
Female Population  𝑚𝑖𝑖= -2.064 + T8 – 0.00606𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖 – 0.0346𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 + 0.0107𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖*𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖 
where the effects of age, age2, income, education level, employment status and sex 
ratio are summarized in T7 and T8. These effects are qualitatively similar with the 
findings in Part (1). 
      The regression result on the interaction term is significant at the 5% level for 
male population and the 1% level for female population. The effect ethnic population 
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share has on marital status, when interaction term is included, becomes -0.00647 
+0.00679𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 for men and -0.00606+0.0107𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 for women. To take a closer 
look at how the OCP affects marital status, substitute OCPic=0 for males and females 
who turned legal marriage age before the implementation of the OCP, and OCPic=1 
for males and females how turned legal marriage age after then implementation of the 
policy: 
 
Males who turned eligible marriage age before the OCP implementation: 
𝜕𝑚𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖
 = -0.00647 +0.00679*0 = -0.00647 
Females who turned eligible marriage age after the OCP implementation: 
𝜕𝑚𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖
 = -0.00647 +0.00679*1 = 0.00032 
Females who turned eligible marriage age before the OCP implementation: 
𝜕𝑚𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖
 = -0.00606 +0.0107*0 = -0.00606 
Males who turned eligible marriage age before the OCP implementation: 
𝜕𝑚𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖
 = = -0.00606 +0.0107*1 = 0.00464 
      The regression results show that the effect ethnic population share has on 
marital status differs significantly before and after the implementation of OCP. The 
negative coefficients when OCPic=0 suggest that ethnic minority population share is 
negatively correlated with marital status of people who turned legal marriage age 
before the implementation of OCP. In other words, before the implementation of the 
OCP, they are less likely to be married in cities with higher ethnic minority population 
shares. After the implementation of the OCP, ethnic minority population share started 
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to have a different effect on people’s marital status, which is reflected by the positive 
coefficient of the interaction term. Starting from the year 1979, in which the OCP 
came into effect, individual’s chance of being married increases as the city level 
ethnic population level increases. However, it should be noticed that among the 9879 
male individuals and the 6623 female individuals included in the regressions, there 
are only 82 ethnic minority men and 60 ethnic minority women. Due to the small 
portion of ethnic minority population, the effects estimated in this section are mainly 
the effects the OCP has on the marital status of Han population. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion and Suggestions for Future Research 
Part 1: Summary of Findings 
      Using 2007 CHIP Data and 2010 Chinese Population Census Data, this paper 
attempts to investigate how marital status of Han and ethnic minorities differ under 
the circumstance of OCP, a topic which has not been fully explored by previous 
research and literatures.  
      This paper finds that after the OCP has been implemented, ethnic identity 
started to play a more influential role in determining individual’s marital status. High 
sex ratio, which resulted from the implementation of the OCP, has a larger effect on 
female population than male population, making Han women in general more popular 
in marriage market and decreasing ethnic minority women’s chances of being 
married.  
      This research also finds that city level ethnic minority population share has a 
large impact on individual’s marital status, especially since the implementation of the 
OCP. After the implementation of the OCP, Han Chinese are more likely to be married 
in cities where there are high ethnic minority population shares, while the large shares 
of ethnic minority population decrease ethnic minorities’ advantages in the marriage 
market, making them less likely to be married in cities with high ethnic minority 
population shares.  
 
Part 2: Policy Implications 
       Though ethnic minorities are exempted from the OCP and granted the right 
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to have more than one child, which adds the gains associated with the marriage, they 
actually do not seem to benefit from the OCP in terms of marriage market. According 
to the findings in this research paper, the unequal implementation of the OCP actually 
brings more advantages to Han Chinese, especially Han women, rather than ethnic 
minorities in the marriage market. The high sex ratio resulted from the OCP makes 
Han female, instead of ethnic minority females, more desirable in the marriage market, 
and even though living in cities with large ethnic minority, ethnic minorities are still 
not as competitive as Han Chinese.  
      It is foreseeable that the effect OCP has on marital status will grow more 
influential and profound as time goes by, and the marital prospect gap of between Han 
Chinese and ethnic minorities will gradually widen over time. Therefore, Chinese 
government should start consider the possible social consequences brought by the 
marital prospect gap, and think about making necessary adjustments to the OCP.   
     
Part 3: Suggestions for Future Research 
      The first generation that was born under the OCP was born in the year 1980, a 
year after the OCP was implemented. Individual data used in this research comes 
from the 2007 CHIP Data. By the time the 2007 CHIP Survey was conducted, the first 
OCP generation was only 27 years old, and the following generations were even 
younger. Therefore, the 2007 Data may not fully reflect the effects the OCP has on 
marital status of the generations that were influenced the policy. Since the CHIP 
Survey is conducted every five years, future research can better estimate the effects 
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the OCP has on marital status by applying the 2012 CHIP Survey Data, which is not 
available to the public at this point.  
      In addition to the age limitation, 2007 CHIP Survey was conducted in cities in 
east part of China. Cities in west China, especially northwest China where large 
ethnic minority population concentrate, were not covered by the survey. This leads to 
the low number of observations of ethnic minority individuals in the data. If future 
research could conduct a more comprehensive survey which covers most of the 
provinces in China, the data would be more useful and accurate when analyzing the 
effects the OCP has on marital status.  
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Appendix 
 
 Table 1 Empirical Result of Basic Regressions  
 
Dependent Variables 
 
 
(1) 
Male Han 
 
(2) 
Female Han 
 
(3) 
Male Ethnic 
 
(4) 
Female Ethnic 
Independent Variables Married 
OLS 
Married 
OLS 
Married 
OLS 
Married 
OLS 
     
Age 0.0289*** 0.0534*** 0.0510** 0.0636 
 (11.81) (16.64) (2.022) (1.240)   Age2 -0.000302*** -0.000628*** -0.000675* -0.000847 
 (-9.058) (-13.54) (-1.944) (-1.247) 
Income 0.030370*** 0.042121*** 0.061507 0.064814 
 (3.821) (3.685) (1.517) (1.454) 
Education level Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Employment status Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Sex ratio 1.118*** 0.982*** 0.179 -0.207 
 (21.53) (17.27) (0.183) (-0.149) 
Ethnic minority 
population share 
0.00790*** 0.0127*** -0.0153*** -0.00970** 
 (3.508) (4.516) (-6.291) (-2.640) 
Constant -1.748*** -2.050*** -0.548 0.377 
 (-20.36) (-24.49) (-0.552) (0.227) 
Number of observations 9,796 6,563 82 60 
R-squared 0.403 0.422 0.703 0.500 
 
Note:  
1. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. For OLS regressions, the values in the table represent the 
coefficients for each independent variable 
2. ***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level; **statistically significant at the 0.05 level; 
*statistically significant at the 0.1 level 
3. Education level and employment status variables are included in the regressions  
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Table 2 Empirical Result of Regressions with Interaction Terms on Sex Ratio and Ethnic Minority Population Share 
Dependent Variables  
 
 
 
(1) 
Male 
 
(2) 
Female 
 
(3) 
Male 
 
(4) 
Female 
 
(5) 
Male 
 
(6) 
Female 
Independent Variables Married 
OLS 
Married 
OSL 
Married 
OSL 
Married 
OSL 
Married 
OSL 
Married 
OSL 
       
Age 0.0293*** 0.0543*** 0.0291*** 0.0539*** 0.0295*** 0.0541*** 
 (11.95) (16.83) (11.96) (16.76) (12.07) (16.72) Age2 -0.000307*** -0.000641*** -0.000304*** -0.000636*** -0.000310*** -0.000639*** 
 (-9.233) (-13.75) (-9.200) (-13.70) (-9.327) (-13.67) 
Income 0.030559*** 0.042703*** 0.0304395*** 0.042216 *** 0.0306*** 0.0425*** 
 (3.823) (3.738) (3.830) (3.723) (3.817) (3.726) 
Education level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Employment status Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Sex ratio 0.853 -0.348 1.117*** 0.977*** 1.196*** 0.981*** 
 (1.154) (-0.452) (21.53) (17.22) (19.72) (13.63) 
Ethnic minority 
population share 
-0.00246* 0.00194 -0.0105*** -0.00618** 0.0236 -0.0126 
 (-1.840) (0.945) (-7.157) (-2.302) (1.380) (-0.510) 
Ethnic identity dummy  
(Han) 
-0.454 -1.516* -0.293*** -0.231*** - - 
 (-0.582) (-1.907) (-5.325) (-3.296) - - 
Han * Sex ratio 0.310 1.372* - - - - 
 (0.418) (1.781) - - - - 
Han * Ethnic minority 
population share 
- - 0.0184*** 0.0190*** - - 
 - - (6.836) (4.879) - - 
Ethnic minority 
population share * Sex 
ratio 
- - - - -0.0233 0.0159 
 - - - - (-1.383) (0.644) 
Constant -1.333* -0.569 -1.456*** -1.806*** -1.827*** -2.040*** 
 (-1.711) (-0.715) (-14.24) (-16.57) (-19.95) (-20.91) 
Observations 9,878 6,623 9,878 6,623 9,879 6,623 
R-squared 0.402 0.420 0.405 0.421 0.402 0.419 
Note:  
1. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. For OLS regressions, the values in the table represent the 
coefficients for each independent variable 
2. ***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level; **statistically significant at the 0.05 level; 
*statistically significant at the 0.1 level 
3. Education level and employment status variables are included in the regressions 
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Table 3 Empirical Result of Regressions with Interaction Term between OCP Dummy and Ethnic Minority Population Share 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  
1. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. For OLS regressions, the values in the table represent the 
coefficients for each independent variable. 
2. ***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level; **statistically significant at the 0.05 level; 
*statistically significant at the 0.1 level. 
3. Education level and employment status variables are included in the regressions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
 
 (1) 
Male 
 (2) 
Female 
Independent Variables Married 
OLS 
Married 
OLS 
   
Age 0.0297*** 0.0557*** 
 (8.874) (13.63) Age2 -0.000313*** -0.000664*** 
 (-6.343) (-10.52) 
Income 0.030526*** 0.042543*** 
 (3.823) (3.739) 
Education level Yes Yes 
   
Employment status Yes Yes 
   
Sex ratio 1.154*** 1.012*** 
 (22.14) (17.81) 
Ethnic minority population share -0.00647** -0.00606* 
 (-2.420) (-1.716) 
OCP dummy -0.0147 -0.0346 
 (-0.649) (-1.157) 
OCP dummy * Ethnic minority 
population share 
0.00679** 0.0107*** 
 (2.389) (2.655) 
Constant -1.773*** -2.064*** 
 (-20.27) (-24.48) 
Number of observations 9,879 6,623 
R-squared 0.402 0.419 
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Table 4 Variable Summary  
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
age 36.92338 54.07383 15 55 
income 1747.61 1972.156 0 100000 
sex ratio 1.035518 0.0893156 0.79 1.62 
ethnic     
population 
share (%) 
1.805978 4.022801 0.01 43.16 
 
 
